/*	$OpenBSD: cert.c,v 1.232 2026/04/07 10:59:19 tb Exp $ */
/*
 * Copyright (c) 2022,2025 Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
 * Copyright (c) 2021 Job Snijders <job@openbsd.org>
 * Copyright (c) 2019 Kristaps Dzonsons <kristaps@bsd.lv>
 *
 * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
 * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
 * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
 *
 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
 * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
 * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
 * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
 * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 */

#include <assert.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>

#include "extern.h"

int certid = TALSZ_MAX;

static pthread_rwlock_t	cert_lk = PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER;

/*
 * Check the cert's purpose: the cA bit in basic constraints distinguishes
 * between TA/CA and EE/BGPsec router and the key usage bits must match.
 * TAs are self-signed, CAs not self-issued, EEs have no extended key usage,
 * BGPsec router have id-kp-bgpsec-router OID.
 */
static int
cert_check_purpose(const char *fn, struct cert *cert)
{
	X509				*x = cert->x509;
	BASIC_CONSTRAINTS		*bc = NULL;
	EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE		*eku = NULL;
	const X509_EXTENSION		*ku;
	int				 crit, ext_flags, i, is_ca, ku_idx;

	cert->purpose = CERT_PURPOSE_INVALID;

	/*
	 * Ensure the X.509v3 extensions can be parsed and are cached in x.
	 * Avoids unexpected failure modes of API such as X509_check_ca(),
	 * X509_cmp(), X509_get_extension_flags(), and X509_get*_key_usage().
	 */
	if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) <= 0) {
		warnx("%s: could not cache X509v3 extensions", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	ext_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x);

	/* Key usage must be present and critical. KU bits are checked below. */
	if ((ku_idx = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_key_usage, -1)) < 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, section 4.8.4: missing KeyUsage", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if ((ku = X509_get_ext(x, ku_idx)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, section 4.8.4: missing KeyUsage", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ku)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, section 4.8.4: KeyUsage not critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* This weird API can return 0, 1, 2, 4, 5 but can't error... */
	if ((is_ca = X509_check_ca(x)) > 1) {
		if (is_ca == 4)
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487: sections 4.8.1 and 4.8.4: "
			    "no basic constraints, but keyCertSign set", fn);
		else
			warnx("%s: unexpected legacy certificate", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (is_ca) {
		bc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &crit, NULL);
		if (bc == NULL) {
			if (crit != -1)
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.1: "
				    "error parsing basic constraints", fn);
			else
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.1: "
				    "missing basic constraints", fn);
			goto out;
		}
		if (crit != 1) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.1: Basic Constraints "
			    "must be marked critical", fn);
			goto out;
		}
		if (bc->pathlen != NULL) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.1: Path Length "
			    "Constraint must be absent", fn);
			goto out;
		}

		if (X509_get_key_usage(x) != (KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.4: key usage violation",
			    fn);
			goto out;
		}

		if (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) != UINT32_MAX) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.5: EKU not allowed",
			    fn);
			goto out;
		}

		/*
		 * EXFLAG_SI means that issuer and subject are identical.
		 * EXFLAG_SS is SI plus the AKI is absent or matches the SKI.
		 * Thus, exactly the trust anchors should have EXFLAG_SS set
		 * and we should never see EXFLAG_SI without EXFLAG_SS.
		 */
		if ((ext_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
			cert->purpose = CERT_PURPOSE_TA;
		else if ((ext_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
			cert->purpose = CERT_PURPOSE_CA;
		else
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, section 4.8.3: "
			    "self-issued cert with AKI-SKI mismatch", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if ((ext_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0) {
		warnx("%s: Basic Constraints ext in non-CA cert", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if ((ext_flags & (EXFLAG_SI | EXFLAG_SS)) != 0) {
		warnx("%s: EE cert must not be self-issued or self-signed", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (X509_get_key_usage(x) != KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.4: KU must be digitalSignature",
		    fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/*
	 * EKU is only defined for BGPsec Router certs and must be absent from
	 * EE certs.
	 */
	eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &crit, NULL);
	if (eku == NULL) {
		if (crit != -1)
			warnx("%s: error parsing EKU", fn);
		else
			cert->purpose = CERT_PURPOSE_EE; /* EKU absent */
		goto out;
	}
	if (crit != 0) {
		warnx("%s: EKU: extension must not be marked critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/*
	 * Per RFC 8209, section 3.1.3.2 the id-kp-bgpsec-router OID must be
	 * present and others are allowed, which we don't need to recognize.
	 * This matches RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12.
	 */
	for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) {
		if (OBJ_cmp(bgpsec_oid, sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i)) == 0) {
			cert->purpose = CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER;
			goto out;
		}
	}

	warnx("%s: unknown certificate purpose", fn);
	assert(cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_INVALID);

 out:
	BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bc);
	EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(eku);
	return cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_INVALID;
}

static int
cert_check_sigalg(const char *fn, const struct cert *cert)
{
	const X509		*x = cert->x509;
	const X509_ALGOR	*alg = NULL, *tbsalg;

	/* Retrieve AlgorithmIdentifiers from Certificate and TBSCertificate. */
	X509_get0_signature(NULL, &alg, x);
	if (alg == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: missing signatureAlgorithm in certificate", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if ((tbsalg = X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(x)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: missing signature in tbsCertificate", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	/* This cheap comparison is an undocumented part of X509_verify(). */
	if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(alg, tbsalg) != 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 5280, 4.1.1.2: signatureAlgorithm and signature "
		    "AlgorithmIdentifier mismatch", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	return x509_check_tbs_sigalg(fn, tbsalg);
}

static int
cert_check_subject_and_issuer(const char *fn, const struct cert *cert)
{
	const X509_NAME *name;

	if ((name = X509_get_subject_name(cert->x509)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: X509_get_subject_name", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if (!x509_valid_subject_name(fn, name))
		return 0;

	if ((name = X509_get_issuer_name(cert->x509)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: X509_get_issuer_name", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if (!x509_valid_issuer_name(fn, name))
		return 0;

	return 1;
}

static int
cert_check_validity_period(const char *fn, struct cert *cert)
{
	const ASN1_TIME	*at;

	if ((at = X509_get0_notBefore(cert->x509)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: X509_get0_notBefore() failed", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if (!x509_get_time(at, &cert->notbefore)) {
		warnx("%s: x509_get_time() failed", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	if ((at = X509_get0_notAfter(cert->x509)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: X509_get0_notAfter() failed", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if (!x509_get_time(at, &cert->notafter)) {
		warnx("%s: x509_get_time() failed", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	if (cert->notbefore > cert->notafter) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.6: notAfter precedes notBefore", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	return 1;
}

static int
cert_compliant_rsa_key(const char *fn, struct cert *cert)
{
	EVP_PKEY		*pkey;
	const RSA		*rsa;
	const BIGNUM		*rsa_n, *rsa_e;

	if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert->x509)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: cert without public key", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: expected RSA key", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if ((rsa_n = RSA_get0_n(rsa)) == NULL ||
	    (rsa_e = RSA_get0_e(rsa)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: missing RSA public key component", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) != 2048) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 7935, 3: want 2048-bit RSA modulus, have %d", fn,
		    BN_num_bits(rsa_n));
		return 0;
	}
	if (!BN_is_word(rsa_e, 65537)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 7935, 3: public RSA exponent not %d", fn, 65537);
		return 0;
	}

	return 1;
}

static int
cert_compliant_ec_key(const char *fn, struct cert *cert)
{
	EVP_PKEY		*pkey;
	const EC_KEY		*ec_key;

	if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert->x509)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: cert without public key", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if ((ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: expected EC key", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec_key) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 8608: 3.1 public key not uncompressed", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if (!EC_KEY_check_key(ec_key)) {
		warnx("%s: EC_KEY_check_key failed", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	/* Prepare pubkey for the BRK tree - used in the final output dump. */
	if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER) {
		unsigned char		*der = NULL;
		int			 der_len;

		if ((der_len = i2d_PUBKEY(pkey, &der)) <= 0) {
			warnx("%s: i2d_PUBKEY failed", fn);
			return 0;
		}
		if (base64_encode(der, der_len, &cert->pubkey) == -1)
			errx(1, "base64_encode");
		free(der);
	}

	return 1;
}

static int
cert_check_spki(const char *fn, struct cert *cert)
{
	X509_PUBKEY		*pubkey;
	X509_ALGOR		*alg = NULL;
	const ASN1_OBJECT	*aobj = NULL;
	int			 ptype = 0;
	const void		*pval = NULL;
	int			 rc = 0;

	/*
	 * Should be called _get0_. It returns a pointer owned by cert->x509.
	 * XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 4.
	 */
	pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert->x509);
	if (pubkey == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.7: certificate without SPKI", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/*
	 * Excessive initialization above is due to incoherent semantics of
	 * the following functions, e.g., OpenSSL may or may not set pval.
	 */
	if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg, pubkey) ||
	    alg == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.7: no AlgorithmIdentifier in SPKI", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	X509_ALGOR_get0(&aobj, &ptype, &pval, alg);

	switch (cert->purpose) {
	case CERT_PURPOSE_TA:
	case CERT_PURPOSE_CA:
	case CERT_PURPOSE_EE:
		if (OBJ_obj2nid(aobj) == NID_rsaEncryption) {
			if (ptype != V_ASN1_NULL || pval != NULL) {
				warnx("%s: RFC 4055, 1.2, rsaEncryption "
				    "parameters not NULL", fn);
				goto out;
			}
			if (!cert_compliant_rsa_key(fn, cert))
				goto out;
			break;
		}
		if (!experimental) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 7935, 3.1 SPKI not RSAPublicKey", fn);
			goto out;
		}
		/* FALLTHROUGH */
	case CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER:
		if (OBJ_obj2nid(aobj) == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
			if (ptype != V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
				warnx("%s: RFC 5480, 2.1.1, ecPublicKey "
				    "parameters not namedCurve", fn);
				goto out;
			}
			if (OBJ_obj2nid(pval) != NID_X9_62_prime256v1) {
				warnx("%s: RFC 8608, 3.1, named curve not "
				    "P-256", fn);
				goto out;
			}
			if (!cert_compliant_ec_key(fn, cert))
				goto out;
			break;
		}
		warnx("%s: RFC 8608, 3.1, SPKI not an ecPublicKey", fn);
		goto out;
	default:
		abort();
	}

	rc = 1;
 out:
	return rc;
}

static int
cert_ski(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	ASN1_OCTET_STRING	*os = NULL;
	unsigned char		 md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	unsigned int		 md_len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
	int			 length, rc = 0;

	assert(cert->ski == NULL);

	if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.2: "
		    "SKI: extension not non-critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
	if ((os = X509V3_EXT_d2i((X509_EXTENSION *)ext)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.2: error parsing SKI", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert->x509, EVP_sha1(), md, &md_len)) {
		warnx("%s: X509_pubkey_digest", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	length = ASN1_STRING_length(os);
	if (length < 0 || md_len != (unsigned int)length) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.2: SKI: "
		    "want %u bytes SHA1 hash, have %d bytes",
		    fn, md_len, length);
		goto out;
	}

	if (memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(os), md, md_len) != 0) {
		warnx("%s: SKI does not match SHA1 hash of SPK", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	cert->ski = hex_encode(md, md_len);

	rc = 1;
 out:
	ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
	return rc;
}

static int
cert_aki(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	AUTHORITY_KEYID	*akid = NULL;
	int		 length, rc = 0;

	assert(cert->aki == NULL);

	if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.3: "
		    "AKI extension not non-critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
	if ((akid = X509V3_EXT_d2i((X509_EXTENSION *)ext)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.3: error parsing AKI", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if (akid->issuer != NULL || akid->serial != NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.3: AKI: authorityCertIssuer or "
		    "authorityCertSerialNumber present", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (akid->keyid == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.3: AKI: Key Identifier missing",
		    fn);
		goto out;
	}
	length = ASN1_STRING_length(akid->keyid);
	if (length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.3: AKI: "
		    "want %d bytes SHA1 hash, have %d bytes",
		    fn, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, length);
		goto out;
	}

	cert->aki = hex_encode(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(akid->keyid), length);

	rc = 1;
 out:
	AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid);
	return rc;
}

/*
 * Parse CRL distribution point per RFC 6487, section 4.8.6.
 */
static int
cert_crldp(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	CRL_DIST_POINTS	*crldp = NULL;
	DIST_POINT	*dp;
	GENERAL_NAMES	*names;
	GENERAL_NAME	*name;
	int		 i, rc = 0;

	assert(cert->crl == NULL);

	if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: CRL distribution point "
		    "must be omitted from TA certificates", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: CRL distribution point "
		    "extension not non-critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
	if ((crldp = X509V3_EXT_d2i((X509_EXTENSION *)ext)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: CRL distribution point: "
		    "failed extension parse", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp) != 1) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: CRL distribution point: "
		    "want 1 element, have %d", fn, sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp));
		goto out;
	}

	dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, 0);
	if (dp->CRLissuer != NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: CRL CRLIssuer field"
		    " disallowed", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if (dp->reasons != NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: CRL Reasons field"
		    " disallowed", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if (dp->distpoint == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: CRL: "
		    "no distribution point name", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if (dp->distpoint->dpname != NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: nameRelativeToCRLIssuer"
		    " disallowed", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* Need to hardcode the alternative 0 due to missing macro or enum. */
	if (dp->distpoint->type != 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: CRL DistributionPointName:"
		    " expected fullName, have %d", fn, dp->distpoint->type);
		goto out;
	}

	names = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
	for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) {
		char	*crl = NULL;

		name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i);

		if (!x509_location(fn, "CRL distribution point", name, &crl))
			goto out;

		if (cert->crl == NULL && strncasecmp(crl, RSYNC_PROTO,
		    RSYNC_PROTO_LEN) == 0) {
			cert->crl = crl;
			continue;
		}
		if (verbose)
			warnx("%s: ignoring CRL distribution point %s",
			    fn, crl);
		free(crl);
	}

	if (cert->crl == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.6: no rsync URI in "
		    "CRL distribution point", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	rc = 1;
 out:
	CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(crldp);
	return rc;
}

/*
 * Parse "Authority Information Access" extension for non-TA certs,
 * RFC 6487, section 4.8.7.
 * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
 */
static int
cert_aia(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS	*aia = NULL;
	ACCESS_DESCRIPTION	*ad;
	ASN1_OBJECT		*oid;
	char			*caissuers = NULL;
	int			 i, rc = 0;

	assert(cert->aia == NULL);

	if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.7: AIA must be absent from "
		    "a self-signed certificate", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.7: AIA: "
		    "extension not non-critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
	if ((aia = X509V3_EXT_d2i((X509_EXTENSION *)ext)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.7: AIA: failed extension parse",
		    fn);
		goto out;
	}

	for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia); i++) {
		ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, i);

		oid = ad->method;

		if (OBJ_cmp(oid, caissuers_oid) == 0) {
			if (!x509_location(fn, "AIA: caIssuers", ad->location,
			    &caissuers))
				goto out;
			if (cert->aia == NULL && strncasecmp(caissuers,
			    RSYNC_PROTO, RSYNC_PROTO_LEN) == 0) {
				cert->aia = caissuers;
				caissuers = NULL;
				continue;
			}
			/*
			 * XXX - unclear how to check "Other accessMethod URIs
			 * referencing the same object MAY be included".
			 */
			if (verbose)
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.7: AIA: "
				    "ignoring location %s", fn, caissuers);
			free(caissuers);
			caissuers = NULL;
		} else {
			char buf[128];

			OBJ_obj2txt(buf, sizeof(buf), oid, 0);
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.7: unexpected"
			    " accessMethod: %s", fn, buf);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	if (cert->aia == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.7: AIA: expected caIssuers "
		    "accessMethod with rsync protocol", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	rc = 1;
 out:
	AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free(aia);
	return rc;
}

/*
 * Parse "Subject Information Access" extension for a CA cert,
 * RFC 6487, section 4.8.8.1 and RFC 8182, section 3.2.
 * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
 */
static int
cert_ca_sia(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS	*sia = NULL;
	ACCESS_DESCRIPTION	*ad;
	ASN1_OBJECT		*oid;
	const char		*mftfilename;
	char			*carepo = NULL, *rpkimft = NULL, *notify = NULL;
	int			 i, rc = 0;

	assert(cert->repo == NULL && cert->mft == NULL && cert->notify == NULL);

	if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: "
		    "extension not non-critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
	if ((sia = X509V3_EXT_d2i((X509_EXTENSION *)ext)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: failed extension parse",
		    fn);
		goto out;
	}

	for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia); i++) {
		ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(sia, i);

		oid = ad->method;

		if (OBJ_cmp(oid, carepo_oid) == 0) {
			if (!x509_location(fn, "SIA: caRepository",
			    ad->location, &carepo))
				goto out;
			if (cert->repo == NULL && strncasecmp(carepo,
			    RSYNC_PROTO, RSYNC_PROTO_LEN) == 0) {
				if (carepo[strlen(carepo) - 1] != '/') {
					char *carepo_tmp;

					if (asprintf(&carepo_tmp, "%s/",
					    carepo) == -1)
						errx(1, NULL);
					free(carepo);
					carepo = carepo_tmp;
				}

				cert->repo = carepo;
				carepo = NULL;
				continue;
			}
			if (verbose)
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: "
				    "ignoring location %s", fn, carepo);
			free(carepo);
			carepo = NULL;
		} else if (OBJ_cmp(oid, manifest_oid) == 0) {
			if (!x509_location(fn, "SIA: rpkiManifest",
			    ad->location, &rpkimft))
				goto out;
			if (cert->mft == NULL && strncasecmp(rpkimft,
			    RSYNC_PROTO, RSYNC_PROTO_LEN) == 0) {
				cert->mft = rpkimft;
				rpkimft = NULL;
				continue;
			}
			if (verbose)
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: "
				    "ignoring location %s", fn, rpkimft);
			free(rpkimft);
			rpkimft = NULL;
		} else if (OBJ_cmp(oid, notify_oid) == 0) {
			if (!x509_location(fn, "SIA: rpkiNotify",
			    ad->location, &notify))
				goto out;
			if (strncasecmp(notify, HTTPS_PROTO,
			    HTTPS_PROTO_LEN) != 0) {
				warnx("%s: non-https uri in rpkiNotify: %s",
				    fn, cert->notify);
				free(notify);
				goto out;
			}
			if (cert->notify != NULL) {
				warnx("%s: unexpected rpkiNotify accessMethod",
				    fn);
				free(notify);
				goto out;
			}
			cert->notify = notify;
			notify = NULL;
		} else {
			char buf[128];

			OBJ_obj2txt(buf, sizeof(buf), oid, 0);
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8.1: unexpected"
			    " accessMethod: %s", fn, buf);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	if (cert->mft == NULL || cert->repo == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: missing caRepository "
		    "or rpkiManifest", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	mftfilename = strrchr(cert->mft, '/');
	if (mftfilename == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: SIA: invalid rpkiManifest entry", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	mftfilename++;
	if (!valid_filename(mftfilename, strlen(mftfilename))) {
		warnx("%s: SIA: rpkiManifest filename contains invalid "
		    "characters", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (strstr(cert->mft, cert->repo) != cert->mft ||
	    cert->mft + strlen(cert->repo) != mftfilename) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: "
		    "conflicting URIs for caRepository and rpkiManifest", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (rtype_from_file_extension(cert->mft) != RTYPE_MFT) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: not an MFT file", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	rc = 1;
 out:
	AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free(sia);
	return rc;
}

/*
 * Parse "Subject Information Access" extension for an EE cert,
 * RFC 6487, section 4.8.8.2 and RFC 8182, section 3.2.
 * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
 */
static int
cert_ee_sia(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS	*sia = NULL;
	ACCESS_DESCRIPTION	*ad;
	ASN1_OBJECT		*oid;
	char			*signedobj = NULL;
	int			 i, rc = 0;

	assert(cert->signedobj == NULL);

	if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: "
		    "extension not non-critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
	if ((sia = X509V3_EXT_d2i((X509_EXTENSION *)ext)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: failed extension parse",
		    fn);
		goto out;
	}

	for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia); i++) {
		ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(sia, i);

		oid = ad->method;

		/*
		 * XXX: RFC 6487 4.8.8.2 states that the accessMethod MUST be
		 * signedObject. However, rpkiNotify accessMethods currently
		 * exist in the wild. Consider removing this special case.
		 * See also https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7239.
		 */
		if (OBJ_cmp(oid, notify_oid) == 0) {
			if (verbose > 1)
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8.2: SIA should"
				    " not contain rpkiNotify accessMethod", fn);
			continue;
		} else if (OBJ_cmp(oid, signedobj_oid) == 0) {
			if (!x509_location(fn, "SIA: signedObject",
			    ad->location, &signedobj))
				goto out;
			if (cert->signedobj == NULL && strncasecmp(signedobj,
			    RSYNC_PROTO, RSYNC_PROTO_LEN) == 0) {
				cert->signedobj = signedobj;
				signedobj = NULL;
				continue;
			}
			if (verbose)
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: "
				    "ignoring location %s", fn, signedobj);
			free(signedobj);
			signedobj = NULL;
		} else {
			char buf[128];

			OBJ_obj2txt(buf, sizeof(buf), oid, 0);
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8.1: unexpected"
			    " accessMethod: %s", fn, buf);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	if (cert->signedobj == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.8: SIA: no signedObject", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (!filemode) {
		const char *p = cert->signedobj + RSYNC_PROTO_LEN;
		size_t fnlen, plen;

		fnlen = strlen(fn);
		plen = strlen(p);

		if (fnlen < plen || strcmp(p, fn + fnlen - plen) != 0) {
			warnx("%s: mismatch between pathname and SIA (%s)",
			    fn, cert->signedobj);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	rc = 1;
 out:
	AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free(sia);
	return rc;
}

static int
cert_sia(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	switch (cert->purpose) {
	case CERT_PURPOSE_TA:
	case CERT_PURPOSE_CA:
		return cert_ca_sia(fn, cert, ext);
	case CERT_PURPOSE_EE:
		return cert_ee_sia(fn, cert, ext);
	case CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER:
		warnx("%s: RFC 8209, 3.1.3.3, SIA MUST be omitted from "
		    "BGPsec router certs", fn);
		return 0;
	default:
		abort();
	}
}

/*
 * Parse the certificate policies extension and check that it follows RFC 7318.
 * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
 */
static int
cert_policies(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	STACK_OF(POLICYINFO)		*policies = NULL;
	POLICYINFO			*policy;
	STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO)	*qualifiers;
	POLICYQUALINFO			*qualifier;
	int				 nid;
	int				 rc = 0;

	if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.9: certificatePolicies: "
		    "extension not critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
	if ((policies = X509V3_EXT_d2i((X509_EXTENSION *)ext)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.9: certificatePolicies: "
		    "failed extension parse", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) != 1) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.9: certificatePolicies: "
		    "want 1 policy, got %d", fn, sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies));
		goto out;
	}

	policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, 0);
	assert(policy != NULL && policy->policyid != NULL);

	if (OBJ_cmp(policy->policyid, certpol_oid) != 0) {
		char pbuf[128], cbuf[128];

		OBJ_obj2txt(pbuf, sizeof(pbuf), policy->policyid, 1);
		OBJ_obj2txt(cbuf, sizeof(cbuf), certpol_oid, 1);
		warnx("%s: RFC 7318 section 2: certificatePolicies: "
		    "unexpected OID: %s, want %s", fn, pbuf, cbuf);
		goto out;
	}

	/* Policy qualifiers are optional. If they're absent, we're done. */
	if ((qualifiers = policy->qualifiers) == NULL) {
		rc = 1;
		goto out;
	}

	if (sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(qualifiers) != 1) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 7318 section 2: certificatePolicies: "
		    "want 1 policy qualifier, got %d", fn,
		    sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(qualifiers));
		goto out;
	}

	qualifier = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(qualifiers, 0);
	assert(qualifier != NULL && qualifier->pqualid != NULL);

	if ((nid = OBJ_obj2nid(qualifier->pqualid)) != NID_id_qt_cps) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 7318 section 2: certificatePolicies: "
		    "want CPS, got %s", fn, nid2str(nid));
		goto out;
	}

	rc = 1;
 out:
	sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(policies, POLICYINFO_free);
	return rc;
}

/*
 * Append an IP address structure to our list of results, ensuring there is
 * at most one inheritance marker per AFI and no overlapping ranges.
 */
static int
append_ip(const char *fn, struct cert_ip *ips, size_t *num_ips,
    const struct cert_ip *ip)
{
	if (!ip_addr_check_overlap(ip, fn, ips, *num_ips, 0))
		return 0;
	ips[(*num_ips)++] = *ip;
	return 1;
}

/*
 * Construct a RFC 3779 2.2.3.8 range from its bit string.
 * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
 */
int
sbgp_addr(const char *fn, struct cert_ip *ips, size_t *num_ips, enum afi afi,
    const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs)
{
	struct cert_ip	ip;

	memset(&ip, 0, sizeof(struct cert_ip));

	ip.afi = afi;
	ip.type = CERT_IP_ADDR;

	if (!ip_addr_parse(bs, afi, fn, &ip.ip)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 2.2.3.8: IPAddress: "
		    "invalid IP address", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	if (!ip_cert_compose_ranges(&ip)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 2.2.3.8: IPAddress: "
		    "IP address range reversed", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	return append_ip(fn, ips, num_ips, &ip);
}

/*
 * Parse RFC 3779 2.2.3.9 range of addresses.
 * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
 */
int
sbgp_addr_range(const char *fn, struct cert_ip *ips, size_t *num_ips,
    enum afi afi, const IPAddressRange *range)
{
	struct cert_ip	ip;

	memset(&ip, 0, sizeof(struct cert_ip));

	ip.afi = afi;
	ip.type = CERT_IP_RANGE;

	if (!ip_addr_parse(range->min, afi, fn, &ip.range.min)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 2.2.3.9: IPAddressRange: "
		    "invalid IP address", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	if (!ip_addr_parse(range->max, afi, fn, &ip.range.max)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 2.2.3.9: IPAddressRange: "
		    "invalid IP address", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	if (!ip_cert_compose_ranges(&ip)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 2.2.3.9: IPAddressRange: "
		    "IP address range reversed", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	return append_ip(fn, ips, num_ips, &ip);
}

static int
sbgp_addr_inherit(const char *fn, struct cert_ip *ips, size_t *num_ips,
    enum afi afi)
{
	struct cert_ip	ip;

	memset(&ip, 0, sizeof(struct cert_ip));

	ip.afi = afi;
	ip.type = CERT_IP_INHERIT;

	return append_ip(fn, ips, num_ips, &ip);
}

int
sbgp_parse_ipaddrblocks(const char *fn, const IPAddrBlocks *addrs,
    struct cert_ip **out_ips, size_t *out_num_ips)
{
	const IPAddressFamily	*af;
	const IPAddressOrRanges	*aors;
	const IPAddressOrRange	*aor;
	enum afi		 afi;
	struct cert_ip		*ips = NULL;
	size_t			 num_ips = 0, num;
	int			 ipv4_seen = 0, ipv6_seen = 0;
	int			 i, j, addrsz;

	assert(*out_ips == NULL && *out_num_ips == 0);

	addrsz = sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addrs);
	if (addrsz != 1 && addrsz != 2) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.10: unexpected number of "
		    "ipAddrBlocks (got %d, expected 1 or 2)", fn, addrsz);
		goto out;
	}

	for (i = 0; i < addrsz; i++) {
		af = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addrs, i);

		switch (af->ipAddressChoice->type) {
		case IPAddressChoice_inherit:
			aors = NULL;
			num = num_ips + 1;
			break;
		case IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges:
			aors = af->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges;
			num = num_ips + sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors);
			break;
		default:
			warnx("%s: RFC 3779: IPAddressChoice: unknown type %d",
			    fn, af->ipAddressChoice->type);
			goto out;
		}
		if (num == num_ips) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.10: "
			    "empty ipAddressesOrRanges", fn);
			goto out;
		}

		if (num >= MAX_IP_SIZE)
			goto out;
		ips = recallocarray(ips, num_ips, num, sizeof(struct cert_ip));
		if (ips == NULL)
			err(1, NULL);

		if (!ip_addr_afi_parse(fn, af->addressFamily, &afi)) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 3779: invalid AFI", fn);
			goto out;
		}

		switch (afi) {
		case AFI_IPV4:
			if (ipv4_seen++ > 0) {
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.10: "
				    "IPv4 appears twice", fn);
				goto out;
			}
			break;
		case AFI_IPV6:
			if (ipv6_seen++ > 0) {
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.10: "
				    "IPv6 appears twice", fn);
				goto out;
			}
			break;
		}

		if (aors == NULL) {
			if (!sbgp_addr_inherit(fn, ips, &num_ips, afi))
				goto out;
			continue;
		}

		for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors); j++) {
			aor = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
			switch (aor->type) {
			case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
				if (!sbgp_addr(fn, ips, &num_ips, afi,
				    aor->u.addressPrefix))
					goto out;
				break;
			case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
				if (!sbgp_addr_range(fn, ips, &num_ips, afi,
				    aor->u.addressRange))
					goto out;
				break;
			default:
				warnx("%s: RFC 3779: IPAddressOrRange: "
				    "unknown type %d", fn, aor->type);
				goto out;
			}
		}
	}

	*out_ips = ips;
	*out_num_ips = num_ips;

	return 1;

 out:
	free(ips);

	return 0;
}

/*
 * Parse an IP Resources X.509v3 extension, RFC 6487 4.8.10, with
 * syntax documented in RFC 3779 starting in section 2.2.
 * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
 */
static int
sbgp_ipaddrblocks(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	IPAddrBlocks	*addrs = NULL;
	int		 rc = 0;

	if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.10: ipAddrBlocks: "
		    "extension not critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
	if ((addrs = X509V3_EXT_d2i((X509_EXTENSION *)ext)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.10: ipAddrBlocks: "
		    "failed extension parse", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (!sbgp_parse_ipaddrblocks(fn, addrs, &cert->ips, &cert->num_ips))
		goto out;

	if (cert->num_ips == 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.10: empty ipAddrBlocks", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	rc = 1;
 out:
	IPAddrBlocks_free(addrs);
	return rc;
}

/*
 * Append an AS identifier structure to our list of results.
 * Makes sure that the identifiers do not overlap or improperly inherit
 * as defined by RFC 3779 section 3.3.
 */
static int
append_as(const char *fn, struct cert_as *ases, size_t *num_ases,
    const struct cert_as *as)
{
	if (!as_check_overlap(as, fn, ases, *num_ases, 0))
		return 0;
	ases[(*num_ases)++] = *as;
	return 1;
}

/*
 * Parse a range of AS identifiers as in 3.2.3.8.
 * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
 */
int
sbgp_as_range(const char *fn, struct cert_as *ases, size_t *num_ases,
    const ASRange *range)
{
	struct cert_as		 as;

	memset(&as, 0, sizeof(struct cert_as));
	as.type = CERT_AS_RANGE;

	if (!as_id_parse(range->min, &as.range.min)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 3.2.3.8 (via RFC 1930): "
		    "malformed AS identifier", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	if (!as_id_parse(range->max, &as.range.max)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 3.2.3.8 (via RFC 1930): "
		    "malformed AS identifier", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	if (as.range.max == as.range.min) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3379 section 3.2.3.8: ASRange: "
		    "range is singular", fn);
		return 0;
	} else if (as.range.max < as.range.min) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3379 section 3.2.3.8: ASRange: "
		    "range is out of order", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	return append_as(fn, ases, num_ases, &as);
}

/*
 * Parse an entire 3.2.3.10 integer type.
 */
int
sbgp_as_id(const char *fn, struct cert_as *ases, size_t *num_ases,
    const ASN1_INTEGER *i)
{
	struct cert_as	 as;

	memset(&as, 0, sizeof(struct cert_as));
	as.type = CERT_AS_ID;

	if (!as_id_parse(i, &as.id)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 3.2.3.10 (via RFC 1930): "
		    "malformed AS identifier", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if (as.id == 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 3.2.3.10 (via RFC 1930): "
		    "AS identifier zero is reserved", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	return append_as(fn, ases, num_ases, &as);
}

static int
sbgp_as_inherit(const char *fn, struct cert_as *ases, size_t *num_ases)
{
	struct cert_as as;

	memset(&as, 0, sizeof(struct cert_as));
	as.type = CERT_AS_INHERIT;

	return append_as(fn, ases, num_ases, &as);
}

static int
cert_as_inherit(const struct cert *cert)
{
	if (cert->num_ases != 1)
		return 0;

	return cert->ases[0].type == CERT_AS_INHERIT;
}

static int
cert_has_one_as(const struct cert *cert)
{
	if (cert->num_ases != 1)
		return 0;

	return cert->ases[0].type == CERT_AS_ID;
}

int
sbgp_parse_asids(const char *fn, const ASIdentifiers *asidentifiers,
    struct cert_as **out_as, size_t *out_num_ases)
{
	const ASIdOrRanges	*aors = NULL;
	struct cert_as		*as = NULL;
	size_t			 num_ases = 0, num;
	int			 i;

	assert(*out_as == NULL && *out_num_ases == 0);

	if (asidentifiers->rdi != NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.11: autonomousSysIds: "
		    "should not have RDI values", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (asidentifiers->asnum == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.11: autonomousSysIds: "
		    "no AS number resource set", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	switch (asidentifiers->asnum->type) {
	case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
		num = 1;
		break;
	case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
		aors = asidentifiers->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges;
		num = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(aors);
		break;
	default:
		warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 3.2.3.2: ASIdentifierChoice: "
		    "unknown type %d", fn, asidentifiers->asnum->type);
		goto out;
	}

	if (num == 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.11: empty asIdsOrRanges", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if (num >= MAX_AS_SIZE) {
		warnx("%s: too many AS number entries: limit %d",
		    fn, MAX_AS_SIZE);
		goto out;
	}
	as = calloc(num, sizeof(struct cert_as));
	if (as == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);

	if (aors == NULL) {
		if (!sbgp_as_inherit(fn, as, &num_ases))
			goto out;
	}

	for (i = 0; i < sk_ASIdOrRange_num(aors); i++) {
		const ASIdOrRange *aor;

		aor = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(aors, i);
		switch (aor->type) {
		case ASIdOrRange_id:
			if (!sbgp_as_id(fn, as, &num_ases, aor->u.id))
				goto out;
			break;
		case ASIdOrRange_range:
			if (!sbgp_as_range(fn, as, &num_ases, aor->u.range))
				goto out;
			break;
		default:
			warnx("%s: RFC 3779 section 3.2.3.5: ASIdOrRange: "
			    "unknown type %d", fn, aor->type);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	*out_as = as;
	*out_num_ases = num_ases;

	return 1;

 out:
	free(as);

	return 0;
}

/*
 * Parse an AS Resources X.509v3 extension, RFC 6487 4.8.11, with
 * syntax documented in RFC 3779 starting in section 3.2.
 * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
 */
static int
sbgp_asids(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
	ASIdentifiers		*asidentifiers = NULL;
	int			 rc = 0;

	if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.11: autonomousSysIds: "
		    "extension not critical", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
	if ((asidentifiers = X509V3_EXT_d2i((X509_EXTENSION *)ext)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 section 4.8.11: autonomousSysIds: "
		    "failed extension parse", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (!sbgp_parse_asids(fn, asidentifiers, &cert->ases, &cert->num_ases))
		goto out;

	rc = 1;
 out:
	ASIdentifiers_free(asidentifiers);
	return rc;
}

/*
 * Parse extensions in a resource certificate following RFC 6487, section 4.8.
 * This must only be called after cert_check_purpose() so we know for sure
 * that issuance, basic constraints, and key usage bits are consistent and
 * what kind of cert we were passed. Annoyingly, callers of cert_parse() can't
 * distinguish BGPsec router certs (a rare kind of EE cert) from CA certs,
 * as they both are .cer files in a Manifest.
 *
 * Then walk the list of extensions, handle each one and ensure there are no
 * duplicates. Store the relevant information in cert.
 */

static int
cert_parse_extensions(const char *fn, struct cert *cert)
{
	X509 *x = cert->x509;
	const X509_EXTENSION *ext;
	const ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
	int extsz, i, nid, bc, ski, aki, ku, eku, crldp, aia, sia, cp, ip, as;

	nid = bc = ski = aki = ku = eku = crldp = aia = sia = cp = ip = as = 0;

	/* This can only work correctly after a call to cert_check_purpose(). */
	assert(cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_INVALID);

	/* Look for X509v3 extensions. */
	if ((extsz = X509_get_ext_count(x)) <= 0) {
		warnx("%s: certificate without X.509v3 extensions", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	for (i = 0; i < extsz; i++) {
		ext = X509_get_ext(x, i);
		assert(ext != NULL);
		/* XXX - cast away const for OpenSSL 3 and LibreSSL */
		obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object((X509_EXTENSION *)ext);
		assert(obj != NULL);

		/* The switch is ordered following RFC 6487, section 4.8. */
		switch (nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj)) {
		case NID_basic_constraints:
			if (bc++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			/* handled in cert_check_purpose() */
			break;
		case NID_subject_key_identifier:
			if (ski++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			if (!cert_ski(fn, cert, ext))
				goto out;
			break;
		case NID_authority_key_identifier:
			if (aki++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			if (!cert_aki(fn, cert, ext))
				goto out;
			break;
		case NID_key_usage:
			if (ku++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			/* handled in cert_check_purpose() */
			break;
		case NID_ext_key_usage:
			if (eku++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			/* handled in cert_check_purpose() */
			break;
		case NID_crl_distribution_points:
			if (crldp++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			if (!cert_crldp(fn, cert, ext))
				goto out;
			break;
		case NID_info_access:
			if (aia++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			if (!cert_aia(fn, cert, ext))
				goto out;
			break;
		case NID_sinfo_access:
			if (sia++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			if (!cert_sia(fn, cert, ext))
				goto out;
			break;
		case NID_certificate_policies:
			if (cp++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			if (!cert_policies(fn, cert, ext))
				goto out;
			break;
		case NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock:
			if (ip++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			if (!sbgp_ipaddrblocks(fn, cert, ext))
				goto out;
			break;
		case NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum:
			if (as++ > 0)
				goto dup;
			if (!sbgp_asids(fn, cert, ext))
				goto out;
			break;
		default:
			/* unexpected extensions warrant investigation */
			{
				char objn[64];

				OBJ_obj2txt(objn, sizeof(objn), obj, 0);
				if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
					warnx("%s: unknown critical extension "
					    "%s (NID %d)", fn, objn, nid);
					goto out;
				}
				warnx("%s: ignoring %s (NID %d)",
				    fn, objn, nid);
			}
			break;
		}
	}

	/*
	 * Check specifics on presence and absence of extensions depending
	 * on the certificate purpose. Some of the checks are redundant with
	 * cert_check_purpose(), some of the checks are also impossible to
	 * hit with the checks in the extension parsers, but it is easier to
	 * check for completeness against RFC 6487 and RFC 8209 if we're not
	 * trying to be smart here.
	 */

	if (bc == 0) {
		if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_TA ||
		    cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_CA) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.1: CA cert without "
			    "basic constraints", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	} else {
		if (cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_TA &&
		    cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_CA) {
			/* This also covers RFC 8209, 3.1.3.1. */
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.1: non-CA cert with "
			    "basic constraints", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	if (ski == 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.2: cert without SKI", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (aki == 0) {
		if (cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.3: non-TA cert without "
			    "AKI", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	} else {
		if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
			if (strcmp(cert->ski, cert->aki) != 0) {
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.3: TA cert with "
				    "mismatch between AKI and SKI", fn);
				goto out;
			}
		} else {
			if (strcmp(cert->ski, cert->aki) == 0) {
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.3: non-TA cert "
				    "must not have matching AKI and SKI", fn);
				goto out;
			}
		}
	}

	if (ku == 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.4: cert without key usage", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (eku == 0) {
		if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 8209, 3.1.3.2: BGPsec Router cert "
			    "without extended key usage", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	} else {
		if (cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.5: non-BGPsec cert with "
			    "extended key usage", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	if (crldp == 0) {
		if (cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.6: non-TA cert without "
			    "CRL Distribution Point", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	} else {
		if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.6: TA cert with "
			    "CRL Distribution Point", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	if (aia == 0) {
		if (cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.7: non-TA cert without "
			    "AIA", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	} else {
		if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.7: TA cert with AIA", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	if (sia == 0) {
		/*
		 * Allow one special snowflake to omit the SIA in EE certs
		 * even though this extension is mandated by RFC 6487, 4.8.8.2.
		 * RFC 9323, 2 clarifies: it is because RSCs are not distributed
		 * through the RPKI repository system.
		 */
		if (filemode && cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_EE) {
			if (rtype_from_file_extension(fn) != RTYPE_RSC) {
				warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.8: cert without SIA",
				    fn);
				goto out;
			}
		} else if (cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.8: cert without SIA", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	} else {
		if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 8209, 3.1.3.3: BGPsec Router cert "
			    "with SIA", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	if (cp == 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.9: missing certificate policy", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (ip == 0 && as == 0) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487, 4.8.10 and 4.8.11: cert without "
		    "IP or AS resources", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
		if (x509_any_inherits(cert->x509)) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 8630, 2.3: Trust Anchor INRs "
			    "must not inherit", fn);
			goto out;
		}
		if (cert->num_ips == 0 && cert->num_ases == 0) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 8630, 2.3: Trust Anchor INR set "
			    "must not be empty", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER) {
		if (ip != 0) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 8209, 3.1.3.4: BGPsec Router cert "
			    "with IP resources", fn);
			goto out;
		}
		if (as == 0) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 8209, 3.1.3.5: BGPsec Router cert "
			    "without AS resources", fn);
			goto out;
		}
		if (cert_as_inherit(cert)) {
			warnx("%s: RFC 8209, 3.1.3.5: BGPsec Router cert "
			    "with inherit element", fn);
			goto out;
		}

		if (!cert_has_one_as(cert)) {
			warnx("%s: BGPsec Router certs with more than one "
			    "AS number are not supported", fn);
			goto out;
		}
	}

	return 1;

 dup:
	warnx("%s: RFC 5280 section 4.2: duplicate extension: %s", fn,
	    nid2str(nid));
 out:
	return 0;
}

static struct cert *
cert_parse_internal(const char *fn, X509 *x)
{
	struct cert		*cert;
	const ASN1_INTEGER	*serial;
	const ASN1_BIT_STRING	*issuer_uid = NULL, *subject_uid = NULL;

	if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);
	cert->x509 = x;

	/*
	 * Figure out the type of certificate we seem to be dealing with to
	 * allow some special casing. Also cache extensions.
	 */
	if (!cert_check_purpose(fn, cert))
		goto out;

	if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 4.1: X.509 version must be v3", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if ((serial = X509_get0_serialNumber(x)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 4.2: missing serialNumber", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if (!x509_valid_seqnum(fn, "RFC 6487 4.2: serialNumber", serial))
		goto out;

	if (!cert_check_sigalg(fn, cert))
		goto out;

	if (!cert_check_subject_and_issuer(fn, cert))
		goto out;

	if (!cert_check_validity_period(fn, cert))
		goto out;

	if (!cert_check_spki(fn, cert))
		goto out;

	/*
	 * Disallowed in RFC 5280, 4.1.2.8. Also, uniqueness of subjects
	 * per RFC 6487, 4.5 makes them meaningless.
	 */
	X509_get0_uids(x, &issuer_uid, &subject_uid);
	if (issuer_uid != NULL || subject_uid != NULL) {
		warnx("%s: issuer or subject unique identifiers not allowed",
		    fn);
		goto out;
	}

	if (!cert_parse_extensions(fn, cert))
		goto out;

	return cert;

 out:
	cert_free(cert);
	return NULL;
}

/*
 * Parse an EE cert extracted from a CMS signed object. Store all cert and
 * extension data we need later in the returned struct cert.
 * Check the certificate's purpose and validate the TA constraints.
 * Returns cert on success and NULL on failure.
 */
struct cert *
cert_parse_ee_cert(const char *fn, int talid, X509 *x)
{
	struct cert		*cert = NULL;

	if (!X509_up_ref(x))
		goto out;

	if ((cert = cert_parse_internal(fn, x)) == NULL)
		goto out;
	cert->talid = talid;

	if (cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_EE) {
		warnx("%s: expected EE cert, got %s", fn,
		    purpose2str(cert->purpose));
		goto out;
	}

	if (!constraints_validate(fn, cert))
		goto out;

	return cert;

 out:
	cert_free(cert);
	return NULL;
}

/*
 * This is a generic parser for resource certificates and can only do as much
 * validation as can be extracted from the bare DER. Callers should at least
 * check the cert->purpose and consider any further validation.
 */
static struct cert *
cert_deserialize_and_parse(const char *fn, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
{
	struct cert		*cert = NULL;
	const unsigned char	*oder;
	X509			*x = NULL;

	oder = der;
	if ((x = d2i_X509(NULL, &der, len)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: d2i_X509", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if (der != oder + len) {
		warnx("%s: %td bytes trailing garbage", fn, oder + len - der);
		goto out;
	}

	if (!X509_up_ref(x)) {
		warnx("%s: X509_up_ref failed", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if ((cert = cert_parse_internal(fn, x)) == NULL)
		goto out;

	X509_free(x);
	return cert;

 out:
	cert_free(cert);
	X509_free(x);
	return NULL;
}

/*
 * Parse a certificate file from its DER. Intended for .cer in a Manifest
 * fileList, so it must be a CA cert or a BGPsec router cert.
 * Returns cert on success or NULL on failure.
 */
struct cert *
cert_parse_ca_or_brk(const char *fn, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
{
	struct cert *cert = NULL;

	/* Handle possible parse_load_file() failure which already warned. */
	if (der == NULL)
		return NULL;

	if ((cert = cert_deserialize_and_parse(fn, der, len)) == NULL)
		goto out;

	if (cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_CA &&
	    cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER) {
		warnx("%s: want CA or BGPsec Router cert, got %s",
		    fn, purpose2str(cert->purpose));
		goto out;
	}

	return cert;

 out:
	cert_free(cert);
	return NULL;
}

/*
 * Parse and partially validate an RPKI X.509 certificate as defined in RFC 6487
 * from its DER encoding. This is intended to be used only from filemode.
 * Returns the parse results or NULL on failure.
 */
struct cert *
cert_parse_filemode(const char *fn, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
{
	struct cert		*cert = NULL;

	/* Handle possible load_file() failure. Currently used by regress. */
	if (der == NULL)
		return NULL;

	if ((cert = cert_deserialize_and_parse(fn, der, len)) == NULL)
		goto out;

	if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_EE) {
		warnx("%s: unexpected EE cert", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	return cert;

 out:
	cert_free(cert);
	return NULL;
}

/*
 * Check that the subjectPublicKeyInfo from the TAL matches the one in the cert.
 * Verify that this key signed the cert.
 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
 */
static int
ta_check_pubkey(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const unsigned char *spki,
    size_t spkisz)
{
	EVP_PKEY	*cert_pkey, *tal_pkey;
	int		 rv = 0;

	/*
	 * We should really verify that the TAL's SPKI is byte-identical with
	 * the cert's SPKI. There's no sane way to access the original DER, so
	 * comparing internal representations is the best thing we can do.
	 */
	tal_pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &spki, spkisz);
	if (tal_pkey == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 (trust anchor): bad TAL pubkey", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if ((cert_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert->x509)) == NULL) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 (trust anchor): missing pubkey", fn);
		goto out;
	}
	if (EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_pkey, tal_pkey) != 1) {
		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 (trust anchor): "
		    "pubkey does not match TAL pubkey", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	/*
	 * Do not replace with a <= 0 check since OpenSSL 3 broke that:
	 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/24575
	 */
	if (X509_verify(cert->x509, tal_pkey) != 1) {
		warnx("%s: failed to verify signature", fn);
		goto out;
	}

	rv = 1;
 out:
	EVP_PKEY_free(tal_pkey);
	return rv;
}

static int
ta_check_validity(const char *fn, struct cert *cert)
{
	time_t		 now = get_current_time();

	if (cert->notbefore > now) {
		warnx("%s: certificate not yet valid", fn);
		return 0;
	}
	if (cert->notafter < now) {
		warnx("%s: certificate has expired", fn);
		return 0;
	}

	return 1;
}

/*
 * Validate a TA against the subjectPublicKeyInfo from the TAL.
 * Check that the SPKIs match, and that the cert is self-signed
 * and currently valid.
 * Returns cert passed in on success or NULL on failure.
 */
struct cert *
ta_validate(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const unsigned char *spki,
    size_t spkisz)
{
	if (cert == NULL)
		return NULL;

	if (cert->purpose != CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
		warnx("%s: expected trust anchor purpose, got %s", fn,
		    purpose2str(cert->purpose));
		goto out;
	}

	if (!ta_check_pubkey(fn, cert, spki, spkisz))
		goto out;
	if (!ta_check_validity(fn, cert))
		goto out;

	return cert;

 out:
	cert_free(cert);
	return NULL;
}

/*
 * Parse a TA from its DER and validate it against SPKI from the TAL and
 * current time.
 * Returns a validated TA cert on success or NULL on failure.
 */
struct cert	*
cert_parse_ta(const char *fn, const unsigned char *der, size_t len,
    const unsigned char *spki, size_t spkisz)
{
	struct cert *cert = NULL;

	/* Handle possible load_file() failure. Will warn later if needed. */
	if (der == NULL)
		return NULL;

	if ((cert = cert_deserialize_and_parse(fn, der, len)) == NULL)
		return NULL;

	return ta_validate(fn, cert, spki, spkisz);
}

/*
 * Free parsed certificate contents.
 * Passing NULL is a noop.
 */
void
cert_free(struct cert *cert)
{
	if (cert == NULL)
		return;

	free(cert->crl);
	free(cert->repo);
	free(cert->path);
	free(cert->mft);
	free(cert->notify);
	free(cert->signedobj);
	free(cert->ips);
	free(cert->ases);
	free(cert->aia);
	free(cert->aki);
	free(cert->ski);
	free(cert->pubkey);
	X509_free(cert->x509);
	free(cert);
}

/*
 * Write certificate parsed content into buffer.
 * See cert_read() for the other side of the pipe.
 */
void
cert_buffer(struct ibuf *b, const struct cert *cert)
{
	io_simple_buffer(b, &cert->notafter, sizeof(cert->notafter));
	io_simple_buffer(b, &cert->purpose, sizeof(cert->purpose));
	io_simple_buffer(b, &cert->talid, sizeof(cert->talid));
	io_simple_buffer(b, &cert->certid, sizeof(cert->certid));
	io_simple_buffer(b, &cert->repoid, sizeof(cert->repoid));
	io_simple_buffer(b, &cert->num_ips, sizeof(cert->num_ips));
	io_simple_buffer(b, &cert->num_ases, sizeof(cert->num_ases));

	io_simple_buffer(b, cert->ips, cert->num_ips * sizeof(cert->ips[0]));
	io_simple_buffer(b, cert->ases, cert->num_ases * sizeof(cert->ases[0]));

	io_str_buffer(b, cert->path);

	if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->mft);
		io_opt_str_buffer(b, cert->notify);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->repo);
		/* No CRL distribution point or AIA for TA certs. */
		io_opt_str_buffer(b, cert->aki);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->ski);
	} else if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_CA) {
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->mft);
		io_opt_str_buffer(b, cert->notify);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->repo);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->crl);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->aia);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->aki);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->ski);
		io_simple_buffer(b, &cert->mfthash, sizeof(cert->mfthash));
	} else if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER) {
		/* No SIA, so no mft, notify, repo. */
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->crl);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->aia);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->aki);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->ski);
		io_str_buffer(b, cert->pubkey);
	} else {
		errx(1, "%s: unexpected %s", __func__,
		    purpose2str(cert->purpose));
	}
}

/*
 * Allocate and read parsed certificate content from descriptor.
 * The pointer must be freed with cert_free().
 * Always returns a valid pointer.
 */
struct cert *
cert_read(struct ibuf *b)
{
	struct cert	*cert;

	if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(struct cert))) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);

	io_read_buf(b, &cert->notafter, sizeof(cert->notafter));
	io_read_buf(b, &cert->purpose, sizeof(cert->purpose));
	io_read_buf(b, &cert->talid, sizeof(cert->talid));
	io_read_buf(b, &cert->certid, sizeof(cert->certid));
	io_read_buf(b, &cert->repoid, sizeof(cert->repoid));
	io_read_buf(b, &cert->num_ips, sizeof(cert->num_ips));
	io_read_buf(b, &cert->num_ases, sizeof(cert->num_ases));

	if (cert->num_ips > 0) {
		cert->ips = calloc(cert->num_ips, sizeof(cert->ips[0]));
		if (cert->ips == NULL)
			err(1, NULL);
		io_read_buf(b, cert->ips,
		    cert->num_ips * sizeof(cert->ips[0]));
	}

	if (cert->num_ases > 0) {
		cert->ases = calloc(cert->num_ases, sizeof(cert->ases[0]));
		if (cert->ases == NULL)
			err(1, NULL);
		io_read_buf(b, cert->ases,
		    cert->num_ases * sizeof(cert->ases[0]));
	}

	io_read_str(b, &cert->path);

	if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_TA) {
		io_read_str(b, &cert->mft);
		io_read_opt_str(b, &cert->notify);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->repo);
		/* No CRL distribution point or AIA for TA certs. */
		io_read_opt_str(b, &cert->aki);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->ski);
	} else if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_CA) {
		io_read_str(b, &cert->mft);
		io_read_opt_str(b, &cert->notify);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->repo);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->crl);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->aia);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->aki);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->ski);
		io_read_buf(b, &cert->mfthash, sizeof(cert->mfthash));
	} else if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_BGPSEC_ROUTER) {
		/* No SIA, so no mft, notify, repo. */
		io_read_str(b, &cert->crl);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->aia);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->aki);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->ski);
		io_read_str(b, &cert->pubkey);
	} else {
		errx(1, "%s: unexpected %s", __func__,
		    purpose2str(cert->purpose));
	}

	return cert;
}

static inline int
authcmp(struct auth *a, struct auth *b)
{
	if (a->cert->certid > b->cert->certid)
		return 1;
	if (a->cert->certid < b->cert->certid)
		return -1;
	return 0;
}

RB_GENERATE_STATIC(auth_tree, auth, entry, authcmp);

void
auth_tree_free(struct auth_tree *auths)
{
	struct auth	*auth, *tauth;
	int error;

	if ((error = pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&cert_lk)) != 0)
		errx(1, "pthread_rwlock_wrlock: %s", strerror(error));
	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(auth, auth_tree, auths, tauth) {
		RB_REMOVE(auth_tree, auths, auth);
		cert_free(auth->cert);
		free(auth);
	}
	if ((error = pthread_rwlock_unlock(&cert_lk)) != 0)
		errx(1, "pthread_rwlock_unlock: %s", strerror(error));
	if ((error = pthread_rwlock_destroy(&cert_lk)) != 0)
		errx(1, "pthread_rwlock_destroy: %s", strerror(error));
}

struct auth *
auth_find(struct auth_tree *auths, int id)
{
	struct auth a, *f;
	struct cert c;
	int error;

	c.certid = id;
	a.cert = &c;

	if ((error = pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&cert_lk)) != 0)
		errx(1, "pthread_rwlock_rdlock: %s", strerror(error));
	f = RB_FIND(auth_tree, auths, &a);
	if ((error = pthread_rwlock_unlock(&cert_lk)) != 0)
		errx(1, "pthread_rwlock_unlock: %s", strerror(error));
	return f;
}

struct auth *
auth_insert(const char *fn, struct auth_tree *auths, struct cert *cert,
    struct auth *issuer)
{
	struct auth *na;
	int error;

	na = calloc(1, sizeof(*na));
	if (na == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);

	if ((error = pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&cert_lk)) != 0)
		errx(1, "pthread_rwlock_wrlock: %s", strerror(error));
	if (issuer == NULL) {
		cert->certid = cert->talid;
	} else {
		cert->certid = ++certid;
		if (certid > CERTID_MAX) {
			if (certid == CERTID_MAX + 1)
				warnx("%s: too many certificates in store", fn);
			goto fail;
		}
		na->depth = issuer->depth + 1;
	}

	if (na->depth >= MAX_CERT_DEPTH) {
		warnx("%s: maximum certificate chain depth exhausted", fn);
		goto fail;
	}

	na->issuer = issuer;
	na->cert = cert;
	na->any_inherits = x509_any_inherits(cert->x509);

	if (RB_INSERT(auth_tree, auths, na) != NULL)
		errx(1, "auth tree corrupted");

	if ((error = pthread_rwlock_unlock(&cert_lk)) != 0)
		errx(1, "pthread_rwlock_unlock: %s", strerror(error));

	return na;

 fail:
	if ((error = pthread_rwlock_unlock(&cert_lk)) != 0)
		errx(1, "pthread_rwlock_unlock: %s", strerror(error));
	free(na);
	return NULL;
}

static void
insert_brk(struct brk_tree *tree, struct cert *cert, int asid)
{
	struct brk	*b, *found;

	if ((b = calloc(1, sizeof(*b))) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);

	b->asid = asid;
	b->expires = cert->notafter;
	b->talid = cert->talid;
	if ((b->ski = strdup(cert->ski)) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);
	if ((b->pubkey = strdup(cert->pubkey)) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);

	/*
	 * Check if a similar BRK already exists in the tree. If the found BRK
	 * expires sooner, update it to this BRK's later expiry moment.
	 */
	if ((found = RB_INSERT(brk_tree, tree, b)) != NULL) {
		if (found->expires < b->expires) {
			found->expires = b->expires;
			found->talid = b->talid;
		}
		free(b->ski);
		free(b->pubkey);
		free(b);
	}
}

/*
 * Add each BGPsec Router Key into the BRK tree.
 */
void
cert_insert_brks(struct brk_tree *tree, struct cert *cert)
{
	size_t		 i, asid;

	for (i = 0; i < cert->num_ases; i++) {
		switch (cert->ases[i].type) {
		case CERT_AS_ID:
			insert_brk(tree, cert, cert->ases[i].id);
			break;
		case CERT_AS_RANGE:
			for (asid = cert->ases[i].range.min;
			    asid <= cert->ases[i].range.max; asid++)
				insert_brk(tree, cert, asid);
			break;
		default:
			warnx("invalid AS identifier type");
			continue;
		}
	}
}

static inline int
brkcmp(struct brk *a, struct brk *b)
{
	int rv;

	if (a->asid > b->asid)
		return 1;
	if (a->asid < b->asid)
		return -1;

	rv = strcmp(a->ski, b->ski);
	if (rv > 0)
		return 1;
	if (rv < 0)
		return -1;

	return strcmp(a->pubkey, b->pubkey);
}

RB_GENERATE(brk_tree, brk, entry, brkcmp);

/*
 * Add each CA cert into the non-functional CA tree.
 */
void
cert_insert_nca(struct nca_tree *tree, const struct cert *cert, struct repo *rp)
{
	struct nonfunc_ca *nca;

	if ((nca = calloc(1, sizeof(*nca))) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);
	if ((nca->location = strdup(cert->path)) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);
	if ((nca->carepo = strdup(cert->repo)) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);
	if ((nca->mfturi = strdup(cert->mft)) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);
	if ((nca->ski = strdup(cert->ski)) == NULL)
		err(1, NULL);
	nca->certid = cert->certid;
	nca->talid = cert->talid;

	if (RB_INSERT(nca_tree, tree, nca) != NULL)
		errx(1, "non-functional CA tree corrupted");
	repo_stat_inc(rp, nca->talid, RTYPE_CER, STYPE_NONFUNC);
}

void
cert_remove_nca(struct nca_tree *tree, int cid, struct repo *rp)
{
	struct nonfunc_ca *found, needle = { .certid = cid };

	if ((found = RB_FIND(nca_tree, tree, &needle)) != NULL) {
		RB_REMOVE(nca_tree, tree, found);
		repo_stat_inc(rp, found->talid, RTYPE_CER, STYPE_FUNC);
		free(found->location);
		free(found->carepo);
		free(found->mfturi);
		free(found->ski);
		free(found);
	}
}

static inline int
ncacmp(const struct nonfunc_ca *a, const struct nonfunc_ca *b)
{
	if (a->certid < b->certid)
		return -1;
	if (a->certid > b->certid)
		return 1;
	return 0;
}

RB_GENERATE(nca_tree, nonfunc_ca, entry, ncacmp);
